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Abstract
Large-scale datasets play a fundamental role in training deep learning models. However,
dataset collection is difficult in domains that involve sensitive information. Collaborative
learning techniques provide a privacy-preserving solution, by enabling training over a
number of private datasets that are not shared by their owners. However, recently, it
has been shown that the existing collaborative learning frameworks are vulnerable to
an active adversary that runs a generative adversarial network (GAN) attack. In this
work, we propose a novel classification model that is resilient against such attacks by
design. More specifically, we introduce a key-based classification model and a principled
training scheme that protects class scores by using class-specific private keys, which
effectively hides the information necessary for a GAN attack. We additionally show
how to utilize high dimensional keys to improve the robustness against attacks without
increasing the model complexity. Our detailed experiments demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed technique.
Keywords: privacy-preserving machine learning, collaborative learning, classification,
generative adversarial networks
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks have shown remarkable performance in numerous domains, in-
cluding computer vision, speech recognition, language processing, and many more. Most
deep learning approaches rely on training over large-scale datasets and computational
resources that makes the utilization of such datasets possible. While large-scale public
datasets, such as ImageNet [1], Celeb-1M [2], and YouTube-8M [3], have a fundamental
role in deep learning research, it is typically difficult to collect a large-scale dataset for
problems that involve processing of sensitive information. For instance, data privacy
becomes a significant concern if one considers training models over personal messages,
pictures or health records.
To enable training over large-scale datasets without compromising data privacy, de-
centralized training approaches, such as collaborative learning framework (CLF) [4], fed-
erated learning [5], personalized learning [6, 7] approaches have been proposed. These
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training schemes enable multiple parties (private data holders) to train a single neural
network model without sharing their sensitive, private data with each other.
In this paper, we consider improving privacy protection mechanism of CLFs. In a
CLF, a target model is trained in a distributed way, where each participant contributes
to training without sharing its (sensitive) data with other participants. More specifically,
each participant hosts only its own training examples, and a central server, called the
parameter server, combines local model updates into a shared model. Therefore, the
training procedure effectively utilizes the data owned by all participants. At the end, the
final model parameters are shared with all participants.
However, there are cases where the original CLF approach fails to preserve data pri-
vacy due to the knowledge embedded in the final model parameters. In particular, [8]
show that the parameters of a neural network model trained on a dataset can be ex-
ploited to partially reconstruct the training examples in that dataset, which is called
a passive attack. To mitigate this threat, one may consider partially corrupting the
model parameters by adding noise into the final model [9]. The study by [4] also shows
that differential privacy [10] can be incorporated into CLF in a way that guarantees
the indistinguishability of the participant data by perturbing parameter updates during
training. However, such prevention mechanisms may introduce a difficult trade-off be-
tween classifier accuracy versus data privacy level for training. Several other differential
privacy based approaches, which introduce noise injection methods [11, 12] or training
frameworks [13], have recently been proposed.
It has been shown that collaborative learning approaches can also be vulnerable to
active attacks i.e., training-time attacks [14]. More specifically, a training participant
can construct a generative adversarial network (GAN) [15] such that its GAN model
learns to reconstruct training examples of one of the other participants over the training
iterations. For this purpose, the attacker defines a new class for the joint model, which
acts as the GAN discriminator, and utilizes the samples generated by its GAN generator
when locally updating the model. In this manner, the attacker effectively forces the victim
to release more information about its samples, as the victim tries to differentiate its own
data from attacker class during its local model updates. To the best of our knowledge
no solution—other than introducing differential privacy to the CLF, has previously been
proposed against the GAN attack1.
In this paper, we propose a novel classification model for collaborative learning that
prevents GAN attacks by design. First, we observe that GAN attacks depend on the
classification scores of the targeted classes. Based on this observation, we define a classi-
fication model where class scores are protected by class-specific keys, which we call class
keys. Our approach generates class keys independently within each training participant
and keeps the keys private throughout the training procedure. In this manner, we pre-
vent the access of the adversary to the target classes, and therefore the GAN attack. We
also demonstrate that the dimensionality of the keys directly affect the security of the
proposed model, much like the length of passwords. We observe, however, that naively
increasing the key dimensions can greatly increase the number of model parameters, and
therefore, reduce the data efficiency and the classification accuracy. We address this
1 [6] claims that their methodology can reduce the efficacy of the GAN attack, however leaves the
analysis for a future work.
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issue by introducing a fixed neural network layer that allows us to use much higher di-
mensional keys without increasing the model complexity. We experimentally validate
that our approach prevents GAN attacks while providing effective collaborative learn-
ing on the MNIST [16] and Olivetti Faces [17] datasets, both of which are challenging
datasets in the context of privacy attacks due to their relative simplicity, and therefore,
the ease of reconstructing the samples in them.
To sum up, our contributions can be summarized as follows: (I) We formalize a
novel classification model for collaborative learning frameworks where we decouple the
end-to-end classifier learning into the shared representation learning and the private
class prediction steps secured by class keys. Making the class predictions private within
each participant enables us to prevent the GAN attacks, while learning a shared image
embedding model which generalizes across the private data hosted by all participants.
(II) We derive a principled training formulation for collaboratively learning the proposed
model when participants are allowed to access only their own class keys. (III) We show
that high-dimensional keys can be used to improve the robustness against attacks and
introduce the idea of using randomly generated fixed neural network layers to map image
representations to higher-dimensional spaces without increasing the number of learnable
parameters. (IV) We investigate the key-based classification setup that we propose for
the purpose of supervised training where all the data is centralized. In this regard,
we show that our regression-like loss formulation achieves comparable results with the
discriminative cross-entropy loss on CIFAR-10/100 datasets [18].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we present a detailed and
technical summary of collaborative learning, GANs, and the GAN attack technique. In
Section 4, we discuss the details of our approach. In Section 5, we provide an experimental
validation of our model. Finally, in Section 6, we make concluding remarks.
2. Related work
Attacks against machine learning mechanisms and privacy preserving machine learn-
ing methods have become a popular research area over the recent years. In [19], authors
discuss different types of adversarial attacks and countermeasures against them. In this
section, we describe the most relevant attacks and countermeasures to our work.
We focus on reconstruction attacks, in which the goal of the adversary is to reconstruct
the training samples of the other participants in a distributed learning setting. Fredrikson
et al . show this threat via a passive attack, in which the adversary does not actively attack
during the learning process, but it tries to reconstruct the training samples from the final
model parameters [8]. In [20], authors develop passive and active inference attacks to
exploit the leakage of sensitive information during the learning process. In particular,
they show the risk of membership inference and attribute inference about training data
(i.e., infer properties that hold for a subset of the training data). In a more recent work,
Hitaj et al . [14] devise a powerful active attack against collaborative learning frameworks.
In this attack, one of the participants in the collaborative learning framework is assumed
to be an adversary. The adversary tries to exploit one of the classes belonging to other
participants (victim) by using a generative adversarial network (GAN) [15]. This attack
is powerful in the sense that the adversary can actively influence the victim to release
more details about its samples during the training process. The GAN attack is aimed for
global data distribution among all clients, therefore it is challenging to run this attack
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for specific clients. Following this idea, Wang et al . [21] propose another GAN based
attack, in which there is a malicious server which leaks model updates of a particular
participant (the victim), and a multi-task discriminator that leads GAN. This way, the
attacker may choose the victim intentionally. By doing so, the authors show how to
discriminate category, reality, and client identity of input samples.
Several countermeasures have been proposed to mitigate the attribute inference at-
tacks for machine learning mechanisms. One line of research on this direction is based
on the differential privacy concept. Differential privacy proposed by Dwork et al . [22]
aims at providing sample indistinguishability with respect to the outputs of an algorithm
(or a neural network model) when its input is slightly changed. This indistinguishabil-
ity criterion is then used as a proxy measure to quantitatively evaluate how well the
algorithm (or the model) can protect the privacy of a subject data. This concept is
formalized for empirical risk minimization in machine learning problems by Chaudhuri
et al . [23, 9]. Song et al . and Rajkumar et al . apply differential privacy to stochastic
gradient descent-based optimization problems [24, 25, 26]. Following that, Shokri et al .,
Abadi et al ., Phan et al . and Papernot et al . propose several ways of employing differ-
ential privacy for large-scale machine learning problems in the forms of (i) structured
noise addition [12, 4, 11] and (ii) 2-step training methodology [13]. Using the differential
privacy concept together with trusted hardware, in [27], authors introduce a privacy-
preserving deep learning framework called Myelin. Similar to differential privacy-based
approaches, in [28], to preserve the privacy of training samples, authors propose using
an obfuscate function to add random noise (or new samples) to the training data be-
fore using it for model generation. Although the use of differential privacy in machine
learning problems has shown promising results, most of the differential privacy-based
approaches offer a trade-off between the privacy and the utility of data, e.g . increasing
the protection reduces the utility of data, and hence the performance of the algorithm.
Therefore, overall, privacy-preserving machine learning without recognition performance
compromise remains as an unsolved problem.
Another line of research advocates the use of decentralized training schemes for pri-
vacy. These strategies enable large-scale machine learning for scenarios, in which private
datasets that contain sensitive information are hosted by multiple parties and therefore
cannot be shared. There are two main streams of approaches: (i) multiple parties train a
single model on the fly by means of contributing to the model updates individually using
their private data [4, 5] and (ii) multiple parties learn separate models over their private
data, and then the final model is constructed by aggregating the information stored in
the different models [29, 26, 30]. Besides, any of the methods considered under this line
can still adopt differential privacy or secure multi-party computation techniques [31, 32],
in which model updates can be encrypted before sharing them with others.
Other than these two major lines of research, the use of cryptographic tools has also
been proposed for privacy-preserving machine learning [19, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. Several
differential privacy-based solutions have been proposed to prevent the GAN attack, in
which a noise signal is added to gradients during the learning phase in order to achieve
differential privacy, and hence prevent the GAN attack [38, 39]. Different from these
works, our proposed work provides a countermeasure against the GAN attack without
requiring a trade-off for utility.
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Figure 1: The comparison of the compute chains constructed during the vanilla (left, a) and the modified
key-protected (right, b) collaborative learning frameworks. In both scenarios, the dataset is split among
two participants, P1 (an honest participant) and P2 (an adversary) and they train a shared neural net-
work model by following the collaborative learning framework procedure defined in [4]. In (a), the shared
model directly outputs class prediction probabilities φθ(x) for an image x and this enables participants
to train the model by optimizing a discriminative loss, i.e. cross entropy between the predicted class
probabilities and the ground truth labels of samples. However, outputting the class scores makes the
shared model vulnerable to the powerful GAN attack [14]. In (b) the participants create a d-dimensional
private class key ψc for each of the classes for which they have training samples and the shared model
outputs d-dimensional image embedding vector φθ(x) for an image x. Moreover, instead of minimizing
the cross entropy loss, they maximize the cosine similarity f(· , ·) between the image embedding vector
φθ(x) and the private key ψc of the correct class c. This way, the class probabilities are concealed from
the attacker. Still, the adversary can attack by means of creating random class keys ψ(rand) (hoping
that the random keys are close enough to any of the real ones created privately by the honest participant)
yet it fails as it is very unlikely that the random keys are close to the real ones.
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3. Background
Our work builds on the collaborative learning framework [4] and tackles the generative
adversarial network attack problem [14]. Therefore, before providing the details of our
approach, we first provide brief background on CLF and the GAN attack in the following.
3.1. Collaborative Learning of Participants
The goal of CLF is to collaboratively train a shared model over private datasets of sev-
eral participants such that the model generalizes across all the private datasets. For this
purpose, CLF defines a protocol where each participant shares with others information
only about its learning progress, rather than the data directly, over the training itera-
tions. Locally, participants train their model as usual using gradient based optimization,
but share with others fractions of changes in model parameters, at predefined intervals.
The framework is set up among participants based on the following components and the
associated policies:
I. A mechanism for participants to share parameter updates. This is typically real-
ized by a trusted third-part parameter server (PS), using which the participants
accumulate the model parameters by uploading and downloading fractions of their
local parameter changes and central model parameters, respectively.
II. A common objective and model architecture. All participants use the same model
architecture and training objective. Typically, participants declare class labels for
which they have training data.
III. Meta-parameters. The hyper-parameters of the CLF setup, such as the parameter
download fraction (θd) and the upload fraction (θu), gradient clipping threshold
(γ), and the order of participants during training (e.g., round robin, random, or
asynchronous) are typically predetermined [4].
Once the framework is established, participants start training on their local datasets in
a predetermined order. When a participant takes turn, it first downloads θd fraction
of parameters from the parameter server and replaces them with its local parameters.
After performing several-steps training (for instance, one epoch of training) on its local
dataset, participant uploads θu fraction of resulting gradients to the parameter server.
It is also possible to incorporate differential privacy i.e., by injecting some form of noise
to the uploaded gradients, to guarantee a certain level of sample indistinguishability for
enhanced privacy protection. But this procedure comes with a trade-off between the
level of privacy and the efficiency (performance) of the accumulated final model. We
encourage readers to refer to [4] for the details of this learning protocol.
3.2. Generative Adversarial Network
Generative adversarial network [15] is an unsupervised learning process for learning
a model of the underlying distribution of a sample set. A GAN model consists of two
sub-models, called generator and discriminator. The generator corresponds to a function
G(z; θG) that aims to map each data point z sampled from a prior distribution, e.g .
uniform distribution U(−1, 1), to a point xˆ in the data space, where θG represents the
generator model parameters. Similarly, the discriminator is a function D(x; θD) that
estimates the probability that a given x is a real sample from the data distribution pD,
where θD represents the discriminator model parameters.
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The generator and discriminator models are trained in turns, by playing a two-player
mini-max game. At each turn, the generator is updated towards generating samples
that are indistinguishable from the real samples according to the current discriminator’s
estimation:
min
θG
Ez∼p(z)
[
log(1−D(G(z; θG)); θD)
]
. (1)
The discriminator, on the other hand, is updated towards distinguishing the samples
given by G from the real ones:
max
θD
Ex∼p(x)
[
log(D(x; θD)
]
+
Ez∼p(z)
[
log(1−D(G(z; θG)); θD)
]
. (2)
GANs have successfully been utilized in numerous problems, e.g . see [40, 41].
3.3. GAN Attack in Collaborative Learning
[14] devise a powerful GAN-based active attack against collaborative learning frame-
works. In this scenario, an adversarial participant takes places during training in a
collaborative learning framework setup in order to extract information about some class
cattack for which any of the other honest participants has samples2. To do that the at-
tacker utilizes the shared model as discriminator network and trains a generator network
to capture the data manifold of the class cattack. Besides, the attacker announces an
incorrect, unique class cfake to label the examples sampled from the generator network.
An overview of this attack is depicted in Figure 1a.
In [14] it is shown that such an approach effectively turns collaborative learning
framework into a GAN training setup where an adversary takes the following steps:
I. The adversary updates its generator network towards producing samples that are
classified as class cattack, by the shared classification model.
II. The adversary takes samples from its generator, labels them as cfake and updates
the shared classification model towards classifying the synthetic samples as class
cfake.
There are two key aspects of the GAN attack. First, throughout the training iterations,
the adversary continuously updates its generator, therefore, it can progressively improve
its generative model and the reconstructions that it provides. Second, since the adver-
sary defines the class cfake as part of the shared model, the participant that hosts cattack
updates the shared model towards minimizing the misclassification of its training exam-
ples into class cfake. Over the iterations, this practically forces the victim into releasing
more detailed information about the class cattack while updating the shared model [14].
This latter step makes the GAN attack particularly powerful as it influences the train-
ing of all participants, and, it is also the main reason why the technique is considered
as an active attack. In this paper, privacy model and proposed protection mechanism
completely follow the threat model defined in [14]. In our experiments, we simulate the
experimental setups of [14, 4] without introducing any extra assumptions.
2The adversary may additionally have its own real classes and a real dataset, but for the sake of
simplicity, we assume that the adversary works only on its privacy attack.
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4. Proposed Method
In this section, we describe the details of our proposed approach. In Section 4.1, we
present our class-key protected classification model, as a prevention mechanism against
the GAN attack [14]. In Section 4.2, we show how such a model can be trained distribut-
edly when each participant has access only to the keys of its own classes, while leveraging
the fundamental tools given the distributed learning framework of Shokri et al . [4]. In
Section 4.3, we discuss practical considerations in generating random class keys. Finally,
in Section 4.4, we propose an extension of our approach that enables efficient incorpo-
ration of high dimensional keys towards minimizing the risk of a successful GAN attack
within our key-protected classification framework.
4.1. Key Protected Classification Model
Our goal is to train a deep (convolutional) neural network based multi-class classifier
in a collaborative manner. Our starting point is the observation that the GAN attack
relies on the knowledge of classification scores of samples belonging to the target class
cattack throughout the training iterations, as discussed in Section 3.3 and in Figure 1a.
To prevent the attack in a collaborative learning setup, we aim to mathematically pre-
vent each participant from estimating the classification scores for the classes hosted by
the other participants. For this purpose, we introduce class-specific keys for all classes
and parameterize the classification function in terms of these keys in a way that makes
classification score estimation without keys practically improbable.
In our approach, we require each participant to generate random class keys for its
classes during initialization, and keep it private until the end of the training process. We
denote the key for class c by ψc ∈ Rdkey , where dkey is the predetermined dimensionality
of each key. In order to protect the model using class keys, we first define the network
with model parameters θ as an embedding function φθ(x) that maps each given input
x, e.g . an image, from the source domain to a dkey-dimensional `2-normalized vector.
Then, we define the classification score for class c by a simple dot product between the
embedding output and the class key:
gθ(x, ψc) = 〈φθ(x), ψc〉,
where ψc, φθ(x) ∈ Rdkey . We note that the class keys are analogous to classification
weight vectors, or equivalently, the components of the very last fully-connected layer
of a standard (mainstream) feed-forward classification neural network. However, unlike
the case in a standard neural network model where the classification weights vectors are
learned during training, here, these vectors are pre-generated and kept fixed throughout
the training process. The training, therefore, takes the form of learning the embedding
model φθ(x).
Therefore, in contrast to a standard classification model where the model produces
all class scores, in the proposed formulation, a participant can compute class scores only
for the classes for which it has class keys. As a result, a participant does not have access
to the the class scores that are necessary by definition for the GAN attack. The overview
of our proposed approach is given in Figure 1b.
Once the embedding model is learned and training is completed, all class keys are
made public so that the resulting model can be used to make predictions for all classes.
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The final classification function takes the form of choosing the class whose key leads to
the highest classification score:
arg max
c∈Call
〈ψc, φθ(x)〉, (3)
where Call is the set of all classes over all participants.
To ensure that the embedding function φθ(x) provides normalized embedding vectors
as required by the definition, an `2-normalization layer is appended to the corresponding
unnormalized embedding network φuθ (x), so that:
φθ(x) =
φuθ (x)
‖φuθ (x)‖
. (4)
A clear reason for incorporating `2-normalization surfaces naturally in the derivation of
our training formulation, which we explain in the next subsection.
Finally, we note that the method is presented with the assumption that only a single
adversary exists, for the sake of brevity. Our framework, however, naturally handles
multiple attackers without requiring any modifications, and, in fact, in Section 5, we do
present experimental results for multiple attackers.
4.2. Learning with Restricted Class Key Access
In this section, we describe our approach for training the classification model, by
making updates locally at each participant, using the restricted training set owned by
the participants. Suppose that a participant owns n training examples, represented by a
set of tuples (xi, ci)
n
i=1. The goal of the local model update is to update the embedding
model φ such that it minimizes the negative label likelihood of the training examples by
regularized risk minimization:
min
θ
−
n∑
i=1
log pθ(ci|xi) +R(θ) (5)
where R(θ) is the regularization function.
We aim to obtain label likelihoods pθ(c|x) based on the scoring function gθ(x, ψ).
However, by design, a participant is not allowed to access keys ψc of other classes,
therefore, cannot estimate the class probability distribution via a conventional softmax
operator over the set of unnormalized class scores. Therefore, in order to define label
likelihoods, we generalize the softmax operator by re-defining it as the ratio of exponenti-
ated target class score and the expectation of exponentiated class scores over all possible
class keys:
p(c|x) = exp gθ(x, ψc)
Eψ[exp gθ(x, ψ)]
(6)
One way to interpret this definition is applying softmax over infinitely many classes,
where class keys follow some probability distribution. Assuming that class keys are
obtained by sampling from the dkey-dimensional standard normal distribution, the ex-
pectation in the denominator can be re-written as:
Eψ[exp(gθ(x, ψ))] =
∫
f(ψ) exp gθ(x, ψ))dψ (7)
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where f(ψ) is the probability density function for standard multivariate normal distri-
bution. It can be shown that the expectation yields the value exp(0.5‖φ(x)‖2) (See Ap-
pendix A). By plugging this result into Eq. 5 and re-arranging the terms, we obtain:
min
θ
−
n∑
i=1
gθ(xi, ψci) + 0.5
n∑
i=1
‖φθ(xi)‖2 +R(θ) (8)
Here, the first term corresponds to maximizing the classification scores, i.e. the sum of
inner product values between each pair of sample embedding φ(x) and the corresponding
class key ψc. The second term applies `2 regularization over the φ(x) embeddings, which
limits the scale of the vectors produced by the embedding network φ(x). Finally, the third
term is simple regularization over the model parameters, for which use `2 regularization.
The second term in Eq. 8 is worth discussing in a bit more detail: unlike conventional
`2 regularization over the network parameters (i.e. R(θ)), it applies `2 regularization to
the outputs of the embedding network. This term, therefore, can be interpreted as a way
to prevent learning a degenerate embedding model that reduces the objective function by
making the embedding vectors, and therefore the classification scores, excessively large.
It is also an interesting result in the sense that it appears naturally in our derivation.
We note that its weight (0.5) could be altered by using a different temperature constant
in Eq. 7, which could be another hyper-parameter. However, as denoted before, we opt
to fix the scale of the embedding vectors by incorporating a final `2 normalization layer
into the network φ(x), which forces the network to focus on the directions, and not the
scales, of the embedding vectors. This is our primary motivation in incorporating the
`2-normalization layer, and, it converts the second term into a constant value of 0.5n,
which we drop from the objective function.
By plugging in the definitions of all terms into Eq. 8 and dropping the second term
from Eq. 8, we obtain the final form of the objective function:
min
θ
−
n∑
i=1
〈φθ(xi), ψci〉+ λ‖θ‖2 (9)
where λ is the regularization weight. The final formulation can be interpreted as a
regression-like training approach that aims to maximize the expected correlation across
the sample embeddings and the corresponding class keys.
4.3. Class Key Generation
In our approach, even if an adversary gets involved during training, it cannot target
a particular class without knowing its class key. However, there is still a chance that the
adversary may target an arbitrary class by using a randomly generated key ψattack as the
target key, and, aim to reconstruct the samples belonging to one of the classes without
necessarily knowing the identity of the targeted class. In principle, such an attack can
be successful if the randomly generated key is sufficiently similar to one of the actual
class keys, if i.e. ‖ψc − ψattack‖2 ≤ δ for any c. However, we emphasize that there is no
supervisory signal that the attacker can utilize to guess private class keys better than
random. It is also not possible to run a GAN attack to reconstruct class keys, due to the
lack of any reference score that can be leveraged for this purpose.
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Figure 2: The correlation between two random vectors with respect to their dimension d. For dkey =
21, · · · , 214 we randomly generate 100 `2-normalized vectors by sampling either fromN (0, 1) or U(−1, 1).
Then, we find maximum of pair-wise dot products of these vectors. We repeat this process 1000 times
for each dkey and plot the maximum of maximums of the pair-wise dot products.
To protect the system against such random key-based brute-force attack, it is essential
to reduce the probability of approximately replicating class keys by randomly generating
keys. Therefore, we need to minimize the probability of generating keys that will lead to
scores highly correlated with one of the class scores, without relying on the restrictions
on the keys used by the participants, such that an adversary will (most likely) not be
successful in training a generative model through a GAN attack.
One may consider addressing this problem by determining all class keys in a cen-
tralized manner. However, such a prevention technique is not reliable as it is typically
not possible to enforce participants to use the assigned keys, i.e. the adversary may still
attempt to attack with a random key. Also it is possible that the central server might be
compromised. For this reason, we let each participant to generate its class keys indepen-
dently. To further reduce the probability of key “conflicts”, i.e. having highly-correlated
class key pairs, we opt to using high-dimensional normally-distributed class keys and
apply `2-normalization to them in practice. This design is rooted in the observation
that as the key dimensionality increases, `2 normalized keys tend to be progressively
less correlated. This observation can easily be verified in an empirical manner: in Fig-
ure 2, we randomly generate 100 `2-normalized vectors, find the maximum of pair-wise
dot products of these vectors and plot the maximum of maximums of the pair-wise dot
products by repeating this process 1000 times for a variety of dkey values. We observe
that as the size of keys increase, the maximum overlap across sampled key pairs sharply
diminishes. From this empirical finding, we can claim that it is more robust to generate
high dimensional vectors to prevent GAN attacks.
We note that while our decentralized scheme addresses the key generation problem
to a large-extend, it may possibly lead to complications in two ways. First, if the partic-
ipants have overlapping classes, they will almost certainly generate and use completely
different keys for their shared classes. Fortunately, it turns out that this does not nec-
essarily lead to the failure of the framework and the approach behaves well to a large
extend, which we experimentally verify in Section 5.
Second, the use of very high-dimensional keys may lead to training difficulties due to
a drastic increase in the model complexity. We show how to address this problem in a
technical and principled way in the following subsection.
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Algorithm 1 Key Protected Classification for Collaborative Learning
Pre-Training Phase:
1: Participants agree on the collaborative learning framework parameters (see Sec-
tion 3.1) and also the dimensionality of private class keys dkey.
2: Each participant p generates a random class key ψpc for each class c of its classes.
3: Each attacker participant p generates (at least) one extra placeholder cpfake and the
corresponding class key ψpattack for running a GAN attack towards some random class
key through adversarial training.
Training Phase
4: for epoch = 1 to nepochs do
5: for p in Participants do
6: download θd fraction of parameters from PS
7: replace downloaded parameters with local ones
8: if p is an attacker then
9: train the local generator by using ψpattack
10: generate M samples from generator
11: label the generated samples as cpfake
12: merge generated samples with local dataset
13: end if
14: train local model with local dataset
15: upload θu fraction of differences in parameters to PS
16: end for
17: end for
18: Participants make their class keys publicly available.
4.4. Learning with High Dimensional Keys
In the proposed framework, as also previously discussed, it is important to have
distinctive class keys, with minimal cross-class key correlations for both the quality of the
resulting classifier and the success of the GAN-attack prevention mechanism (against the
random-key attacks). In order to reduce the probability of having highly-correlated pairs
of randomly and independently generated class keys, we aim to use very high dimensional
vectors. However, naively increasing the class key dimensionality undesirably increases
the number of trainable parameters in the last layer of the φθ(x) network. Therefore,
this increase in the dimensionality of key vectors also increases the complexity of overall
model architecture which may (I) slow down training significantly, (II) cause over-fitting
to training samples, (III) and therefore, lead to a poor test performance.
To overcome these problems, we propose to add a fixed dense layer with an activation
function at the last layer of the architecture. By doing so, parameters of this dense
layer are stochastically predetermined and kept unchanged throughout training. Thus,
the layer does not impose any extra trainable parameters to be learned. This layer,
therefore, effectively maps the preceding low-dimensional embedding vectors to a much
higher dimension space. We pre-define the parameters of this layer and keep it shared
among all participants.
We experimentally verify the effectiveness of this approach: in Section 5.2 and Sec-
tion 5.3 we show that key dimensionality can be increased without deteriorating the
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participant training convergence using the proposed fixed-mapping layer and as a result,
the random-key GAN attacks can be prevented.
Finally, to summarize the overall framework, we present the list of main steps in
Algorithm 1. We note that the underlying collaborative training scheme is the same as
the vanilla collaborative learning algorithm of Shokri et al . [4]. However, unlike [4], here
the participants and the adversary additionally create random private class keys, and,
train the proposed key-protected classification scheme instead of a traditional classifier.
5. Experiments
In this section we demonstrate that our proposed solution prevents GAN attacks while
enabling effective collaborative classifier learning over the participants. We first explain
the experimental setup in Section 5.1. We verify that our key-based learning formulation
performs well in absence of an adversary in Section 5.2. We empirically demonstrate that
our proposed approach prevents GAN attacks in Section 5.3. We evaluate the perfor-
mance of the collaborative learning approach when there are overlapping classes across
the participants in Section 5.4. and finally, we demonstrate that key-based regression
yields comparable results with cross entropy in Section 5.5.
5.1. Experimental setup
We perform experiments on the well-known MNIST handwritten digits [16] and
AT&T Olivetti Faces [17] datasets. We choose these datasets as they provide a par-
ticularly challenging and suitable experimental setup for our purposes: (I) Both of these
datasets contain samples that are relatively easy to generate, therefore, they are partic-
ularly challenging to protect against a GAN attack. While several improvements have
been proposed for improving GANs, e.g . [42, 43, 44, 45], it is well-known that GANs can
be difficult to train [46]. Therefore, we want use datasets where the GAN-attack gen-
erator can easily capture relevant data statistics and perform a successful GAN attack.
This situation allows us to evaluate the proposed CLF scheme in a challenging scenario.
(II) Qualifying the reconstructions obtained by the adversary is relatively easy on these
datasets, which allows us to more confidently argue about the success of our formulation.
We observe that collaborative learning with 5 or more participants is challenging as
parameters in the PS overfit quickly to the local dataset of any one of these participants,
since local models tend to overfit into their local sets as the number of classes per par-
ticipant decreases. To overcome this, we use plain stochastic gradient descent (SGD) for
optimization and instance normalization [47] in the networks. We carefully tune learning
rate and λ on validation sets. Besides, we also find that learning with fixed layer is com-
pelling especially when the fixed layer transforms embeddings to a very high dimensional
space (e.g ., to R16384). For meta-parameters of collaborative learning framework, we set
θd and θu to 1.0 since [14] shows that the GAN attack also works for smaller values of θd
and θu. We also exclude gradient selection mechanism, γ and τ from the experiments.
Finally, we note that while increasing the key dimensionality can increase robustness
against the GAN attack, setting it to a too large value may lead to numerical instability
and/or delay the convergence, therefore, dkey should be treated as an hyper-parameter
and therefore tuned specifically for each model architecture on a separate held out public
dataset with relevant content.
All experiments are implemented in TensorFlow [48].
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(a) MNIST with 2 participants.
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(b) Olivetti Faces with 2 participants.
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(c) MNIST with 3 participants.
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(d) Olivetti Faces with 3 participants.
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(e) MNIST with 5 participants.
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(f) Olivetti Faces with 5 participants.
Figure 3: Mean participant accuracies obtained in collaborative learning with 2, 3, and 5 participants
over the MNIST and the Olivetti Faces datasets. The dashed lines in the MNIST figures indicate that
there are fixed layers in the local models of participants (see Section 4.4 for details). We see that using
a fixed layer tends to delay the training convergence with similar final accuracy. In the Olivetti Faces
plots, fixed layer based experiments are excluded for brevity.
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5.2. Collaborative Learning Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our collaborative learning framework formulation with
private class keys, in the absence of an adversary, in order to show that our formulation
enables effectively learning a shared model. For this purpose, we examine how the key
size dkey and a fixed layer affect the test set accuracy of the local models, over the
training iterations. To do that, we split MNIST among 2, 3 and 5 participants, run
two different collaborative learning frameworks (one with fixed layers and one without
fixed layers) for dkey ∈ {128, 1024, 4096, 16384} and report mean participant accuracies
(MPA) during the training. We also examine mean participant accuracies with respect
to dkey ∈ {128, 1024, 4096, 16384} and number of participants in a collaborative learning
framework when there is no fixed layer in local models of participants for the Olivetti
Faces dataset. The results of these experiments are given in Figure 3.
Observations. We find that even on MNIST it takes considerably longer time to
achieve a high classification accuracy compared to the centralized case when applying
collaborative learning framework in its vanilla form, e.g . without any “hacks” to stabilize
and speed up learning. We believe that this is due to the noise introduced by participants
when they upload parameters to the server from their local models after performing one
epoch of local training. We note that, however, in this work we focus not on improving
the training performance of collaborative learning framework, but instead on evaluating
the proposed approach within the existing CLF protocol.
MNIST experiments show that fixed layers yield better scores only when dkey = 128.
For other key dimensionalities and when same hyper-parameters used, we see that a
fixed layer delays the convergence time of participants. In the Olivetti Faces experiments
we see that in all cases all participants can achieve at least 95% test set accuracy. All
these results suggest that fixed layer can be used as an effective tool for increasing the
embedding dimensionality without increasing the model complexity, with some penalty
mainly in the convergence speed.
From now on, in all experiments, we share a fixed layer among the participants during
their local trainings.
5.3. Preventing GAN Attack
In this section we evaluate the success of our approach in preventing GAN attacks.
We perform three sets of experiments to cover different aspects of our proposed solution:
I. The class key of one of the classes is given to the adversary.
II. Adversary generates random keys that are δ far (measured in Euclidean distance)
from some class key (‖ψattack − ψc‖ = δ for some c).
III. Adversary generates random keys.
We evaluate samples generated by attackers both qualitatively (by visual inspection)
and quantitatively by computing accuracies of the samples using an MNIST model pre-
trained on centralized data. For this evaluation, we pre-train a CNN model to classify
the MNIST digits over the complete dataset and use this model to classify synthetic
samples generated by an adversary.
In Experiment I., we demonstrate the extreme case in which adversary guesses the
exact same key of any class in collaborative learning framework. Although this is very
unlikely to happen in practice with high-dimensional class keys (due to the fact that high
dimensional keys overlap less, as previously discussed in Figure 2), we consider this case
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as a baseline, in which case the GAN attack is expected to be successful. The results
for this case over the MNIST and Olivetti Faces datasets are presented in Figure 4. In
these results, we observe that the attacker succeeds in reconstructing target class images
with high visual similarity, as expected. These results verify the effectiveness of the GAN
attack in our experimental setup.
In Experiment II., we conduct a study to understand the success of the GAN attack
as a function of the minimum similarity between the GAN attack key and one of the
actual class keys. For this purpose, we provide the attacker a function that takes the key
of the victim class (ψdesired), and a predefined degree of similarity (δ), and, generates an
`2 normalized random key ψattack such that the generated key approximates the key of
the victim class: ‖ψattack−ψdesired‖ ≈ δ. We experiment with several values of δ ∈ [0, 1.3]
and see that as δ decreases, the attacker starts to generate visually more similar images
to the ones in the victim. By visually inspecting the reconstructions of the adversary, we
deduce that for δ ≥ 1.1 on Olivetti Faces, the GAN attack produces incomprehensible
results. In almost all attack experiments we observe that generator of an adversary tends
to collapse into a single mode that is either a noise or a meaningful image, depending on
the δ value. Consequently, on MNIST, we find a sharp threshold at δ = 0.5 such that
when δ ≥ 0.5 the synthesized samples become unrecognizable for the pre-trained MNIST
classifier. Reconstructions for different values of δ are given in Figure 5 for the Olivetti
Faces and MNIST datasets.
In Experiment III., we show that our model is robust against the GAN attack when
there is no constraint on key generation, i.e. all keys are randomly and independently
generated by the participants, including the guessed ones. We show in Figure 6 and
Figure 7 that for sufficiently large key dimensionalities, the GAN attack fails on both
MNIST and Olivetti Faces, respectively. In addition, we observe that the pre-trained
MNIST classifier obtains 0% accuracy on the generated examples, which also support our
claim that GAN attack fails. This situtation occurs in practice since the local generators
of the adversaries collapse to singular modes whose samples are unrecognizable for the
pre-trained classifier.
5.4. Shared Classes Among Participants
So far, we have assumed that there are no overlapping training classes across the
participants. However, our approach can be utilized even in the cases where participants
own samples from shared classes, without sharing their private class keys. We claim that
as class keys becomes nearly orthonormal to each other, a properly trained shared model
would learn to map samples belonging to same class but hosted by different participants to
an space spanned by the private class keys defined for that class by different participants.
In this section, we show that our formulation works well when there exist shared classes
among the participants.
Let c be a class shared by the participants i and j. Let there exist two class key vectors
in R2, namely ψic and ψjc , which are two distinct keys of class c generated by participants
i and j, respectively. φθ is the network that maps input data (e.g., images) into the
embedding space. Let Xci and Xcj be the samples that participants i and j have for class
c. For our analysis, we assume that the angle between ψic and ψjc are approximately
orthogonal, which is correct in practice when the class keys are high-dimensional, `2-
normalized vectors. In addition, as we expect observing similar examples in Xci and Xcj ,
we assume, for simplicity, that the sets Xci and Xcj contain a single shared sample xc.
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(a) MNIST
(b) Olivetti Faces
Figure 4: Demonstration of GAN attack when the attacker has access to the exact key of the
class that it is attacking, on the (a) MNIST and (b) Olivetti Faces datasets. We split the classes among
two participants, one being an adversary. In each dataset, we perform 5 different experiments, where
the adversary attacks one of the classes owned by the victim. In MNIST (a), the victim owns the digit
classes 0-4, and, we directly present the GAN attack results. In Olivetti Faces (b), the victim owns the
photos of 20 people, and, we show both the original class samples (upper row) and the corresponding
GAN attack reconstructions (lower row). Overall the results demonstrate the effectiveness of the GAN
attack, when key-based protection is not utilized.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
(j) (k) (l)
Figure 5: We approximate the maximum Euclidean distance between any class key and ψ(cattack)
necessary for the adversary to succeed in attack. From (a) to (f) and (g) to (l), reconstructions of the
adversary when it generates random keys that are δ ∈ {1.3, 1.2, 1.1, 1.0, 0.5, 0.1} far from the key of the
class whose label is 24 in Olivetti Faces dataset and 0 in MNIST dataset, respectively.
Then, since ‖ψic‖ = ‖ψjc‖ = 1 by definition, and, ‖φθ(xc)‖ = 1 due to the `2-
normalization layer at the output of the network, the training objective, i.e. maximization
of the dot product between the sample embedding and class key, for xc can equivalently
expressed in terms of minimizing the angle between ψic and φθ(xc) (denoted by α1), and,
between ψjc and φθ(xc) (denoted by α2) 3. In this simple example devised in R2, maxi-
mizing 〈ψic, φθ(xc)〉 and 〈ψjc , φθ(xc)〉 with respect to θ by participants i and j iteratively
would converge to a model such that 〈ψic, φθ(xc)〉 ≈ 〈ψjc , φθ(xc)〉 ≈ 0.7 (i.e. cos(pi/4)),
and α1 ≈ α2 ≈ pi/4.
In consideration of this behavior in much higher dimensional spaces, we perform
the following experiments. For demb = {64, 256, 1024, 4096, 16384}, we generate three
`2 normalized vectors, namely ψic, ψjc and φ(xc). Then we update φ(xc) to maximize
〈ψic, φ(xc)〉 and 〈ψjc , φ(xc)〉 until convergence, by simple gradient descent. We repeat this
procedure 1000 times and plot maximum of the scores obtained either by 〈ψic, φ(xc)〉 or
by 〈ψjc , φ(xc)〉 for all dkey in Figure 8 (left). We see that scores converge to 0.7 as we
increase the class key dimensionality.
We continue our analysis by measuring the dot product of the tuned φ(xc) with
random class keys representing other classes. Our purpose is to interpret the optimization
3〈ψc, φθ(xc)〉 = ‖ψc‖2 · ‖φθ(xc)‖2 · cos(α) = cos(α)
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Figure 6: GAN attack results on the MNIST dataset using random attack keys. We split MNIST among
5 participants which are also attackers. Figures from left to right correspond to sample reconstructions
obtained by each adversary, when dkey = 16834. We run the experiments until each participant achieves
97% accuracy on its local dataset. One can see that generators fail at capturing a valid digit mode which
indicates that the GAN attack is prevented.
Figure 7: GAN attack results on the Olivetti Faces dataset using random attack keys. From left to right,
reconstructions of adversary for dkey ∈ {128, 1024, 4096, 16834}, respectively. We show that the mode
that GAN learns is likely to belong one of the classes in collaborative learning framework, for small dkey.
However, as dkey become larger, the quality of the GAN attack reconstructions degrade drastically.
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Figure 8: (Left) We randomly generate `2 normalized ψic, ψ
j
c , φ(x
c) ∈ Rdkey for dkey ∈
{64, 128, 1024, 4096, 16384}. Then we find the optimal φ(xc) such that its dot product with ψic and
ψjc are maximized. Bars indicate that as we increase the dimensionality, ψic and ψ
j
c are more likely to
be orthogonal, therefore φ(xc) ends up being a vector at 0.7 correlation with each one. MS: Maximum
score. (Right) We generate new `2 normalized vectors in Rdkey for dkey ∈ {64, 128, 1024, 4096, 16384},
and check their maximum absolute dot product with the final φ(xc). We see that as we increase dkey,
φ(xc) converges towards the space spanned by ψic and ψ
j
c . This confirms that the approach is likely to
behave well when training over shared classes, despite using different private keys across the participants.
MADP: Maximum absolute dot product.
19
output of the previous experiment. For each tuned φ(xc) we generate `2 normalized
vectors ψnewk for k = 1, ..., 1000 and plot maximum absolute dot products of all ψ
new
k and
φ(xc), in Figure 8 (right). Results indicate that when dkey is sufficiently high, multiple
participants can declare the same set of labels. For each common label, the accumulated
model is likely to map samples belonging to the shared class onto a space spanned by
the embeddings defined for that class among the participants. The resulting space is
likely to be nearly orthogonal to any other class key. At test time, as labels are assigned
according to the Equation 3, having multiple keys for a class does not constitute an issue,
i.e. we can simply assign a test sample to the class whose one of the keys maximizes the
classification score.
These observations confirm that the approach is likely to behave well when training
over shared classes, despite using different private keys across the participants. Overall,
the network is likely to map samples to points that are highly correlated with all duplicate
keys of their ground-truth classes, and highly uncorrelated with the other ones. In fact,
we have empirically verified that training with shared classes perform with no observable
issues on both MNIST and Olivetti Faces (example results are omitted for brevity). Our
experiments also suggest that when using sufficiently long (i.e. high-dimensional) keys,
generator of each attacker is able to capture some mode that does not match with any of
the modes of the classes in the collaborative learning framework, according to fake class
key generated by the attacker.
5.5. Evaluating the Key Based Regression Loss
We are also curious about the performance of our regression-like objective that we
formulate in Equation 9 when it is used out of the privacy context, e.g . in the supervised
classification setup where all the training data is centralized. For this purpose, we train
several ResNet-10 [49] models on the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets [18] by opti-
mizing the cross entropy loss and the key-based cosine similarity loss, which we refer to
as the key-based regression, and compare their results.
In the original ResNet models, there is one fully connected layer mapping non-negative
image embeddings (obtained at the output of the last convolutional layer) to classification
scores by computing dot products between weight vectors in the fully connected layer and
the image embeddings then adding bias terms in the fully connected layer. Instead, in our
experiments we compute cosine similarity scores between the weight vectors in the fully
connected layer and the image embeddings. In cross entropy experiments, the weights
of the fully connected layer are trainable, whereas in key-based regression experiments
we replace the trainable weights with fixed orthonormal class keys, which we obtain by
QR decomposition before training starts. Finally, we modify the last convolutional layer
by replacing the ReLU activation function with the tanh, based on the observation that
computing cosine similarities by using non-negative image embeddings φθ(x) tends to
make training unstable.
Top-1 accuracies obtained for both loss functions are shown in Table 1. We see
that key-based regression outperforms cross entropy on CIFAR-10 by a small mar-
gin, whereas on cross-entropy performs better on CIFAR-100. These results indicate
that orthonormal class keys enforce the network to produce sufficiently orthonormal
class codes at the last fully connected layer, and make the overall training formulation
discriminative. We leave an elaborate study for key-based regression in a future work.
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Objective Dataset Top-1
Key-based regression CIFAR-10 94.8%
Cross entropy CIFAR-10 94.0%
Key-based regression CIFAR-100 73.6%
Cross entropy CIFAR-100 74.2%
Table 1: Key-based regression versus cross entropy.
6. Conclusion
We have presented a collaborative learning technique that is resilient to the GAN
attack. More specifically, we have introduced a classification model for participants,
where random class keys represents classes. This key-based model provides effective
learning over the participants and by utilizing high dimensional keys, class scores of an
input is protected against an active adversary that may aim to execute a GAN attack. We
have presented a principled training technique for the case of restricting the access of each
participant to only its own private keys, and, a way to increase key dimensionality without
increasing the model complexity. We have verified the effectiveness of our formulation
by empirically showing that (i) the adversary is no longer able to choose which class to
exploit, and (ii) generator trained by the adversary cannot capture data distribution well
enough to reconstruct any class. We believe that the proposed approach makes a step
towards making collaborative learning safe and practical, which can potentially have a
fundamental impact on learning models in sensitive data domains.
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Appendix A. Softmax Over Infinitely-many Classes
In this section, we show the detailed derivation of our softmax generalization to
infinitely-many classes. Below, we use the subscript notation on ψ to denote dimensions,
instead of classes, and, use d instead of dkey for brevity. In order to compute p(c|x) =
exp gθ(x,ψc)
Eψ[exp(gθ(x,ψ))] , we need to compute the expectation in the denominator:
Eψ∼N [exp(gθ(x, ψ))] =
∫
ψ
f(ψ) exp (gθ(x, ψ)) dψ (A.1)
Since the class keys are assumed to follow multivariate standard normal distribution, the
integration can be simplified as follows:∫
ψ
f(ψ) exp (gθ(x, ψ)) dψ =
∫
ψ1
...
∫
ψd
f(ψ1)...f(ψd) exp (g(x, ψ)) dψ1...dψd (A.2)
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By re-arranging the terms and plugging-in Eq. 4.1, we obtain:∫
ψd
f(ψd)
∫
ψd−1
f(ψd−1)...
∫
ψ1
f(ψ1) exp
(
ψTφ(x)
)
dψ1...dψd (A.3)
By converting the exponent of summation into a product of exponents, we obtain:∫
ψd
f(ψd)e
φd(x)ψd
∫
ψd−1
f(ψd−1)eφd−1(x)ψd−1 ...
∫
ψ1
f(ψ1)e
φ1(x)ψ1dψ1...dψd (A.4)
where φi(x) refers to the i-th dimension of the φ(x) vector. Here, the inner-most term
can be integrated out easily:∫
ψ1
f(ψ1)e
φ1(x)ψ1dψ1 =
1√
2pi
∫
ψ1
e−
1
2ψ
2
1eφ1(x)ψ1dψ1 (A.5)
=
1√
2pi
∫
ψ1
e−
1
2 (ψ1−φ1(x))2e
1
2φ1(x)
2
dψ1 (A.6)
= e
1
2φ1(x)
2
(A.7)
where the last step is based on the observation that the remaining terms correspond to
integrating out Gaussian probability density function with µ = φ1(x) and σ = 1. Now,
we can plug-in this result into Eq. A.4 and repeatedly integrate out each dimension:
e
1
2φ1(x)
2
∫
ψd
f(ψd)e
φd(x)ψd ...
∫
ψ2
f(ψ2)e
φ2(x)ψ2dψ2...dψd (A.8)
=
d∏
i=1
e
1
2φi(x)
2
= exp
(
1
2
d∑
i=1
φi(x)
2
)
= exp
(
1
2
‖φ(x)‖2
)
(A.9)
Finally, by plugging-in Eq. 4, we obtain a constant value of exp(0.5):
Eψ∼N [exp(gθ(x, ψ))] = exp
(
1
2
‖φ(x)‖2
)
(A.10)
= exp
(
1
2
∥∥∥∥ φu(x)‖φu(x)‖
∥∥∥∥2
)
(A.11)
= exp (0.5) (A.12)
which completes the proof our generalization of softmax to infinitely-many classes takes
the following final form:
exp gθ(x, ψc)
Eψ[exp gθ(x, ψ)]
=
1
exp 0.5
exp (gθ(x, ψc)) . (A.13)
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